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ABSTRACT 
High impact, low frequency (HILF) events are a growing concern in civilian 
and military domains. Two HILF events of concern are geomagnetic disturbances 
(GMDs), also known as geomagnetic storms, and high-altitude electromagnetic 
pulses (HEMPs). These two events have the potential to cripple electric grids and 
damage electronics. The study of HEMPs and their effects on the electric grid have 
often been associated with the effects of GMDs. The quicker rise-times and larger 
magnitudes of electric fields induced by HEMPs, as compared to GMDs, can 
significantly impact the large disturbance voltage stability of the power system. 
This dissertation presents a methodology for integrating HEMP impacts into power 
system transient stability assessments. The beginning simulations of this 
dissertation use relatively simple models to model the dynamics in the power 
system. As the dissertation progresses, more detailed and accurate models are 
incorporated in order to capture the most realistic response as possible. Various test 
cases were created in order to simulate the effects of HEMP on power systems as a 
part of this research. The research and transient stability studies performed in this 
dissertation indicate that second to minute long dynamics are crucial when 
simulating the impacts of HEMPs on power systems in order to gain an accurate 
understanding of the impacts. This research created and determined power system 
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models appropriate for HEMP analysis, and ultimately serves to inform power 
system engineers about what models are most suitable in use for HEMP analysis 
on the electric grid.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Geoelectric fields can be induced at the earth’s surface during geomagnetic 
storms and high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMPs). These fields drive 
damaging dc currents, geomagnetically induced currents (GICs), into the electricity 
grid through Y-grounded transformers. GICs have caused widespread power 
outages (1989, Quebec) and they have damaged large electrical equipment, such as 
high voltage transformers [1]. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) identifies the two primary risks associated with geomagnetic disturbances 
(GMDs) as (1) damage to bulk power system assets, such as high voltage power 
transformers, and (2) voltage instability leading to a system collapse due to the loss 
of reactive power support [1] caused by transformer saturation and/or misoperation 
of protection devices leading to tripping of capacitors, etc.  
HEMPs produce a low frequency burst of energy which interacts with the 
earth’s magnetic field similar to the way a GMD interacts with the field, but more 
severely [2]. A HEMP is typically associated with a nuclear detonation in the 
atmosphere, at least 30 km above the surface of the earth. Detailed theory on the 
electromagnetic pulse generated by a HEMP can be found in [3]. The United States 
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and Russia performed independent testing of HEMPs in the 1960s. Due to the 
negative effects to the environment and to existing technology, the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty was passed in 1963 which banned nuclear weapon tests in the 
atmosphere, outer space, and under water [4]. The study of HEMPs has evolved 
into non-nuclear laboratory testing. These tests are usually much smaller than that 
of a HEMP, so the results are scaled accordingly. Another way to study HEMPs is 
through simulation. Simulation is beneficial when considering the effects on large, 
critical infrastructures, like the power grid. This chapter presents an overview of 
the HEMP phenomenon and its effects on the power grid.  
The energy released from a HEMP manifests itself into three different 
electric field waveforms referred to as E1, E2, and E3, as seen in Fig. 1. 
Figure 1 represents a standard design waveform developed by the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to serve as a guideline for 
unclassified HEMP studies. Each of these electric fields affects power system assets 
differently, since their frequencies differ significantly from one another. Often, the 
modeling and simulation of different power systems phenomena are studied 
separately based on their time range of response. For example, it is not necessary 
to include boiler and other long-term dynamics when studying lightning 
propagation. The lightning disturbance will be over before the long-term dynamics 
have time to respond. 
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Fig. 1. Three electric field waveforms generated by a benchmark HEMP from IEC 
61000-2-9 [5] 
 
The two responses can be decoupled, from a time response perspective. 
Similarly, certain aspects of E1, E2, and E3 waveforms and their effects on the 
power system can be studied separately.  
In 2003, an EMP commission was organized by the United States Congress 
to assess the following: 
1. the nature and magnitude of potential high-altitude EMP threats to the 
United States from all potentially hostile states or non-state actors that have 
or could acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles enabling them to 
perform a high-altitude EMP attack against the United States within the next 
15 years; 
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2. the vulnerability of the United States military and especially civilian 
systems to an EMP attack, giving special attention to vulnerability of the 
civilian infrastructure as a matter of emergency preparedness; 
3. the capability of the United States to repair and recover from damage 
inflicted on the United States military and civilian systems by an EMP 
attack; and 
4. the feasibility and cost of hardening select military and civilian systems 
against EMP attack. 
A description of their findings and recommendations is available in an 
executive report [6] and a critical national infrastructures report [7]. 
The vulnerability of critical national infrastructure is the primary driver for 
HEMP studies. Out of the infrastructures labeled critical, the electric power grid is 
considered the most critical by the EMP commission [7]. This is because almost all 
other infrastructures depend on the electric grid; transportation, emergency 
services, government services, oil and gas, communications and water, to name a 
few, require power to function adequately. Without electric power, all of the listed 
infrastructures will eventually fail. 
The grid is not designed to tolerate catastrophic events that result in 
simultaneous impacts such as a HEMP. The HEMP three waves could leave the 
grid in a crippled state, full of damaged assets. Black start procedures and hardware 
do not exist to bring the grid back from such a devastated state. High voltage 
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transformers have a lead time on the scale of years, delaying the restoration of 
power to the affected regions. Furthermore, other critical infrastructures which 
would be used to restart the grid may have suffered damage as well; this includes  
transportation of fuel for the generators and communication systems as immediate 
significant examples. 
Given the waveforms in Fig. 1 as a baseline, several power system 
components could be affected by a HEMP. The high frequency energy in the E1 
waveform has the potential to couple into all unshielded electronic devices.  E1 has 
a rise time of a few nanoseconds. The higher the electric field, the more potential 
there is for damage in electronic devices. From a power system perspective, this 
energy can couple into protective relays, SCADA system components, digital 
control systems (DCSs), programmable logic chips (PLCs), and communication 
systems. The EMP commission exposed these systems to simulated EMP, by 
performing free field testing as well as current injection testing. Failures in all tested 
devices were noted. The damage was quantified to increase 10 fold with every 
doubling of the electric field. The failures came in a number of forms, ranging from 
physical damage to the corruption of data.  
Due to the extremely high electric field of E1, arc flashovers occurred on 
small electronic devices. SCADA provides data acquisition and control to the 
power system over large geographical areas. SCADA systems under the envelope 
of the EMP will all simultaneously be receiving/sending corrupted data and actions 
6 
 
to the grid under the duress of an EMP. The control system does not know that the 
data has been corrupted and will send improper control signals to the protective 
relays and other devices which control the power grid. This can lead to improper 
load shedding, resulting in the collapse of the power system as the frequency 
deviates beyond its defined operating region. In the distribution system, arcing 
across insulators and pole mounted transformers is of high concern. This translates 
to a loss of load, causing the frequency to uncontrollably increase beyond its limit, 
thus making the power system unstable. 
High valued assets in the power system, such as high voltage transformers, 
are protected by relays and switching mechanisms. If significant damage from E1 
occurs, the high valued assets will be left exposed and vulnerable to the oncoming 
E2 and E3 waves of the blast. The E2 wave is similar to a lightning strike, except 
it is widespread and happens simultaneously throughout the grid. Even though the 
magnitude of E2 is less than a lightning strike, the existing protection in the electric 
grid is not designed for such a widespread simultaneous impact. The higher 
frequency energy of the E1 and E2 waves have the potential to couple into long 
unshielded conductors, effectively becoming radiative antennas. The impacts of E1 
and E2 waves on power systems were studied with electromagnetic transient pulse 
tools in [8], [9]. 
E3 waves induce violent fluctuations in the earth’s magnetic field. These 
currents are large enough to damage high value transmission system components, 
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like generator step-up transformers. The transformer cores become saturated by 
means of the dc current. As a result, the transformers suffer hot spot heating, 
produce even and odd harmonics, and consume reactive power. The E3 wave itself 
can further be divided into two waves, E3A and E3B. The E3A wave is a result of 
the magnetic field distortions due to the initial nuclear blast. The E3B wave is the 
result of a later, slower magnetic field distortion due to the weapon’s energized 
debris. The research on the effects of E3 on the electric grid is usually associated 
with steady-state, solar storm induced GMD analysis. While E3B and GMDs share 
similar magnitudes and rise-times, E3A has higher magnitudes and rises much 
faster.  Similar to E3, solar storms cause variations in the earth’s magnetic field, 
which induce geoelectric fields and thus GICs.  
Existing HEMP E3 studies on the power grid have been performed using 
GMD power flow analysis [10]. As previously mentioned, this analysis is 
inadequate for HEMP E3 due to the quick rise times associated with the 
disturbance. In [10], a background of HEMP E3 is given, as well as its potential 
impacts to the bulk United States electric grid, through a series of studies. Each 
study assumes a different blast scenario and discusses which systems would be 
affected. In each scenario, potential damage to circuit breakers, EHV transformers 
and GSU transformers are cited. However, like most research, the document avoids 
concluding that a disturbance like this will collapse the grid. Instead the document 
states that such a result is possible.   
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Historically, GICs due to GMDs have caused long-lasting blackouts and 
damage to power system hardware [11]. Lumping E3 and GMD research together 
provides a general understanding of how E3 can affect the grid. It is convenient that 
the two topics share this commonality, but it is important to recognize and study 
their differences. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INCORPORATING GIC MODELING 
INTO TRANSIENT STABILITY 
 
GIC enters and leaves the grid through wye-grounded transformers, Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of GIC flow in a power system [12] 
Early information on the inclusion of GIC in the power flow can be found 
in [13] and later, with the consideration of large systems, in [14], [15]. Originally, 
the electric field variation was represented as dc voltage sources in the ground, in 
series with the substation grounding resistance [13]. While this method is valid for 
uniform geoelectric fields, it was later shown that for non-uniform geoelectric fields 
it is more accurate to model the dc voltage sources in the transmission lines 
Geoelectric Field
GIC
+-
+-
+-
Vinduced
Vinduced
Vinduced
Rest of System
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themselves [16]. The geoelectric field induced line voltages, Vinduced, are calculated 
according to  
 

 inducedV E dl , (1) 
where ?̅? is the geoelectric field and d𝑙 ̅ is the incremental distance along the 
transmission line path, Σ . Next, the field induced line voltages are represented as 
Norton equivalent current injections, I, and used to calculate the dc bus voltages of 
the system, V, according to  
 I GV . (2) 
G is a square matrix comprised of the power network’s conductance values. The 
elements of G are determined by the parallel combination of the lines’ three phases. 
It has similar form to the system admittance matrix except the values are purely real 
and the matrix is augmented to include substation neutral buses and substation 
ground resistance values. With the system’s dc bus voltages known, the GIC, in its 
respective branch, can be calculated using Ohm’s law. 
To demonstrate the calculation of GIC flow in detail, consider the four bus 
power system in Fig. 3. The system has been exposed to a left-right geoelectric 
field of 1.5 V/km. The length of the transmission line between buses 1 and 3 is 
100 km. 
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Fig. 3. One-line diagram of four bus system 
This system has two generators, two high voltage generator step-up 
transformers that are grounded wye, and a high voltage transmission line 
connecting the two transformers. The integration of the electric field has already 
been performed and an induced dc voltage source value of 150.0 V results. The 150 
V serves as an input to this GIC model. The brown arrows represent the direction 
and magnitude of the calculated GIC. Explicitly noted in the one-line diagram are 
the substation grounding resistances, transformer winding resistances, and the 
resistance of the transmission line. All of these values are required to accurately 
calculate the GIC. The GIC is calculated by first augmenting the system to include 
the substation ground buses and then performing nodal analysis. The dc circuit is 
shown in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Augmented dc network 
The first thing to notice is that the diagram now includes buses 5 and 6, with 
open ends on nodes 2 and 4. The existence of the delta connection between buses 
1 and 4, and buses 2 and 3 prevents the GIC from flowing through generators. The 
inline voltage source has been converted to its Norton equivalent, and will serve as 
a current injection in the nodal analysis. Also, consistency in single phase, or three 
phase value of resistance is of high importance. The GIC enters and exits through 
the grounded transformers but it splits evenly among the three phases of the 
transmission line. In the following calculations, three phase resistance values are 
used. Symbolically, (2) evaluates to  
 
dc line 11 13 15 1
22 26 2
dc line 31 33 36 3
44 45 4
51 54 55 5
62 63 66 6
V R G 0 G 0 G 0 V
0 0 G 0 0 0 G V
V R G 0 G 0 0 G V
0 0 0 0 G G 0 V
0 G 0 0 G G 0 V
0 0 G G 0 0 G V
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
          
 . (3) 
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Since the resistance of the generators is not known, a value of 1 is assigned, 
to prevent the conductance matrix from being singular. It should be clear that this 
number only assists in the matrix inversion. Since there is no current flow in the 
branch connecting nodes 4 and 5, the assigned resistance does not matter, as long 
as the chosen value does not make the matrix ill conditioned. Substituting the values 
into (3) and solving, the following dc voltages result, 
 
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
V11 0 1 0 10 0 150 28.125
V0 1 0 0 0 1 0 18.75
V1 0 11 0 0 10 150 28.125
V0 0 0 1 1 0 0 18.75
V10 0 0 1 16 0 0 18.75
V0 1 10 0 0 16 0 18.75

         
      
      
        
       
       
        
      
         
 V. (4) 
The three phase GIC flow can now be calculated by Ohm’s law, in accordance with 
the system topology, 
   3 sub 5GIC G V 5 18.75 93.75       A. (5) 
The GIC in each phase of the transmission line can be found by dividing the three 
phase GIC by three, to achieve 31.25 A [17]. For large systems, sparse vector 
methods are employed for the calculation of V.  
GIC can cause half-cycle saturation in high voltage power transformers. 
This saturation translates into increased reactive power losses in the transformer, 
among other things. The exact relationship between the GIC and the reactive power 
losses is an ongoing research effort. Based on [18], [19], [20], the transformer’s 
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reactive power losses vary linearly with the terminal voltage. In per unit form, a 
reactive power loss relationship with respect to the GIC could be written as 
 
, ,Loss pu pu GIC puKIQ V  , (6) 
where Vpu is the transformer terminal voltage in per unit, K is a transformer type 
dependent scaling factor which is unitless, IGIC is an “effective” GIC in pu which is 
also transformer type dependent, and QLoss is the reactive power loss in pu of the 
transformer. The need for a transformer type dependent scalar, K, and effective 
GIC, IGIC, arises from the fact that different transformer configurations and 
transformer types facilitate neutral current flow and core saturation differently, Fig. 
5. For example, in an autotransformer, the GIC actually flows through the 
transformer, since it is not electrically isolated like a generator step-up transformer 
would be.  
 
Fig. 5. The variation of the MVar consumption vs. the input GIC per phase [18] 
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The K value is derived from the slope of the lines in Fig. 5. More work on how 
GICs flow through transformers and mapping the transformer losses due to GIC 
into the power flow is shown in [15]. Experimental work with GIC in transformers 
was performed in [21], also showing a linear mapping between the reactive power 
losses and GIC. 
Some of the lingering questions of model verification and validation in this 
research area are beginning to be addressed. More monitoring equipment is being 
installed. As a result, more data is being made available for researchers. However, 
there are still gaps in some of the modeling of the system components. Ideally, all 
the model parameters, such as substation grounding resistance, transformer 
winding resistance, transformer configuration, to name a few, would be known. 
These parameters are usually known only by the owners of the equipment, i.e. the 
utility. If the real data for these parameters is unknown to the model, the values 
must be estimated in order to calculate the GIC. The impact these estimations have 
on the system are beginning to be studied. The sensitivity of GIC to substation 
grounding resistance is introduced in [22], with the conclusion being GIC can be 
quite dependent on the substation grounding resistant values. 
Another area of model uncertainty is the problem of how to model the delay 
between GIC flow and saturation. This delay is very important because it 
determines when the transformers begin to consume reactive power due to GIC 
saturation. Little research has been done in this area, however, results point toward 
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a delay on the order of a few seconds [23], [24]. This dissertation first contains 
simulations based on a zero time delay between the GICs and the onset of 
transformer saturation. Later, the simulations use a first-order lag delay. The delay 
length tends to be transformer specific. So, a simple general model was created 
which delays the saturation by a user-selected number of seconds. 
When performing power system GIC studies, it is important to understand 
the impacts of neighboring systems. For example, is it necessary to calculate the 
impacts of GIC throughout the entire Eastern Interconnect to determine the impacts 
to a specific utility? An algorithm for determining system sensitivity GIC line flow 
is presented in [25], indicating that systems outside the surrounding area of interest 
play little role.  
Special attention should be given to the quick rise-times and large 
magnitudes of electric fields induced by HEMPs; in particular, how HEMPs fit into 
the dynamics of the electric grid. Figure 6 depicts how the HEMP waveforms align 
with the time responses of power system dynamics. 
Comparing this with Fig. 1, it is clear that all frequencies emitted by a 
HEMP interact with the power system to some extent. Figure 6 also directs 
researchers toward the appropriate modeling and simulation detail needed when 
considering HEMPs and their effects on the power system. The time response of 
transient stability, along with governor and load frequency control, align directly 
with E3. 
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Fig. 6. Potential impacts of a HEMP to a power system correlated by their time 
range response, adapted from [26] 
Geomagnetic storms are usually not studied in the transient stability time 
frame. Their typical rise-times of minutes makes them appropriate for power flow 
studies. This is not to say that a storm could not produce rise-times that would fall 
into the transient stability domain. Rise-times of GICs on the order of 30 seconds 
have been recorded [27]. Preliminary consideration of voltage stability impacts of 
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GMD induced GIC has recently been studied [28]. The authors showed that GMD-
type disturbances with quicker rise-times warrant transient stability analysis.  
HEMP E3 has rise-times on the order of seconds, where GMDs have rise-
times on the order of minutes. HEMP E3 is a prime candidate for large disturbance, 
short-term transient stability analysis, thus motivating this research. 
E3 induces violent fluctuations in the earth’s magnetic field due to magneto-
hydrodynamic effects. The changes are so violent that GICs on the order of 
hundreds to thousands could propagate in the grid [7]. These currents are large 
enough to damage high value transmission system components, like generator step-
up transformers. The transformer cores become saturated by means of the dc 
current. As a result, the transformers suffer hot spot heating, produce even and odd 
harmonics, and consume reactive power.  
The E3 wave itself can further be divided into two waves, E3A and E3B. 
Examination of test data from before the nuclear test ban treaty was in effect, as 
well as advances in theoretical and numerical modeling, lead to the qualitative 
understanding of the E3A and E3B fields available now. 
E3A is a result of the geomagnetic field distortions due to the initial nuclear 
blast. A magnetic bubble is formed due to the geomagnetic fields being pushed 
ahead of the conducting region. The expansion of the bubble is a function of the 
speed of the weapon debris, density of the atmosphere, and altitude. Seen from a 
distance, the perturbation of the field resembles a dipole, aligned with the 
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geomagnetic field lines at the blast location. The time of day, as well as the solar 
cycle, can affect the strength and timing of the induced fields. A detonation during 
times of heightened solar activity will tend to slow down the expansion and collapse 
of the magnetic bubble, thus decreasing the induced field magnitude. 
Figure 7 is an image of the earth overlaid with a contour of the peak field 
magnitudes for E3A. The areas describe the electric field direction. This scenario 
assumes the EMP was detonated over central Mexico, 400 km above the earth. 
 
Fig. 7. Spatial variation of E3A for a detonation 400 km above central Mexico 
[10] 
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The most intense areas of the field occur over the northern United States. It 
can be seen that a very small amount of the earth, or even the United States, 
experiences fields higher than 35-40% peak. For this dissertation, spatial 
distribution data from [10] will be combined with the temporal/magnitude 
evolution data from [5] in order to use more realistic electric field scenarios in 
simulations. 
The ground is shielded directly under the blast. This is due to the first 
emitted x-rays intensely ionizing a patch in the atmosphere, directly beneath the 
blast. This highly conductive patch protects the underlying area from the vertical 
penetration of the magnetic fields. As a result, the fields experience a sliding effect 
and the most intense fields are seen at the edge of the patch, oriented 
perpendicularly to the magnetic fields [10]. 
E3B is the result of a later, slower magnetic field distortion due to the 
weapon’s energized debris, inside the magnetic bubble, following the geomagnetic 
field lines. The debris heats up, ionizing the upper atmosphere, causing it to 
buoyantly rise and expand. The center of the ionized region is heated more, causing 
it to rise faster than the edges. This rising plasma passes through geomagnetic field 
lines, inducing currents due to the dynamo effect. Currents begin to flow in the 
ionized region, in turn, inducing magnetic fields at the surface of the earth. Figure 
8 shows the spatial variation of the E3B geoelectric field for a blast above the 
central continental United States, 130 km in altitude [10]. A quantitative electric 
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Fig. 8. Spatial variation of E3B for a detonation 130 km above central continental 
United States [10] 
 
field waveform for E3B is provided by [10]. The authors of [10] admit, “many 
aspects of the model should not be taken too seriously”, (pp. 2-11). They believe 
the electric field falls more rapidly than the model they provided. 
The IEC provides equations for unclassified use, which describe the 
induced geoelectric field for E1, E2, and E3 [5]. A composite E3 wave is given by, 
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      3 -i jE t E t E t  , (7) 
  
 0
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. 
The curve in Fig. 9 is described by (7), (8), and (9). The waveform is considered 
composite because it combines E3A and E3B. The waveform assumes a uniform 
ground conductivity of 𝜎𝑔 = 10
−4 S/m. For other ground conductivities, the 
electric field scales according to E3~𝜎𝑔
−1/2. No guidance is given in regard to the 
spatial variation of the geoelectric field in [5]. The composite wave is discretized  
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Fig. 9. E3(t) waveform in V/m 
into 140 samples, Fig. 9, to serve as input electric field data to the simulations in 
this dissertation. 
A concern that must be addressed is determination of what strength of 
electric fields should be applied to which regions for E3A. In order to simulate the 
HEMP on a power network, certain detonation parameters must be assumed. The 
IEC waveform is a time-varying uniform field, lacking spatial variation. A uniform 
field simulation is a good start; however, a more realistic approach would be to 
analyze the impacts of different peak field magnitudes according to possible field 
distributions. One possible field distribution is shown in Fig. 7. 
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The later, E3B, wave begins at approximately 60 seconds. Since the fields 
vary so slowly, minutes to hours, the dynamics no longer play an important role in 
the modeling. Hence, E3A and E3B can be decoupled and studied separately. 
Steady-state GMD analysis methods can be applied to E3B. Dynamic, transient 
stability analysis is needed for studying E3A. The focus of this dissertation is 
dynamic analysis of E3A. 
The transient stability problem consists of integrating differential algebraic 
equations of the form, 
  , yx f x   (10) 
  0 , yg x , (11) 
where (10) are differential equations representing the dynamics of the system, and 
(11) are the stator algebraic and network equations. The x represents the dynamic 
state variables, and y represents the power flow state variables such as bus voltage 
and angle. The equations are determined by the types and parameters of dynamic 
models used in the simulation, as well as the characteristics of the underlying power 
system network. 
The additional reactive power loading due to the GIC saturated transformers 
can be modeled in the network algebraic equations. The reactive power losses due 
to GIC are represented as a constant reactive current load since the losses vary 
linearly with voltage while the current remains independent. Since a load can be 
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present at a generator bus or a load bus, the reactive power balance equations are 
shown for each in (12) and (13), respectively. 
  ,
1
, , sin 0, 1,...,Gen i i k ik
n
L i Loss i i k ik
k
Q Q VQ V Y i m  

       (12) 
  , ,
1
sin 0, 1,...,i
n
L i L k ikoss i i k ik
k
Q i m nQ VV Y   

        (13) 
QL,i, from (12) and (13), is the sum of the reactive load at bus i and the 
reactive power loss due to GIC at bus i, from (6). QGen,i is the reactive power 
supplied by the generator at bus i. Vi is the voltage at bus i. Yik and αik are the 
admittance and admittance angle, respectively, between buses i and k. The bus 
angle is given by θ. There are m generator buses and n total buses. The real power 
network equations are not shown here, since the loading on the transformers due to 
GIC is strictly reactive. The impact of existing transformer loading is not accounted 
for in this model. In a real power system, transformers already operating near their 
maximum VA rating will enter saturation faster during a GMD than similar 
transformers that are not as heavily loaded, and hence would demand reactive 
power sooner. In this research, neither existing non-GIC loading nor proximity to 
saturation is considered in the calculation of QLoss. The reactive power losses due 
to GIC are represented as a constant reactive current load since the losses vary 
linearly with voltage.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DYNAMIC MODELING IMPACTS 
There is a variety of static and dynamic models for electric machines, 
exciters, governors, stabilizers, and loads. Different models are appropriate for 
different studies. For example, the GENROU model provides a good approximation 
for the behavior of a synchronous generator over the dynamics of interest during a 
transient stability study. A variety of models used in WECC studies can be found 
in [29].  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the E3 impacts can be modeled as a large-
disturbance, short-term voltage stability problem. Hence, the load models used in 
the system will play a major role. Load modeling is a challenging aspect of dynamic 
system modeling. Depending on the response time of the disturbance, among other 
things, load models can significantly impact transient stability results. The load is 
constantly changing, with key diurnal and temperature variations. The model 
should hold valid for low voltages due to disturbances that may occur in transient 
stability.  
Load models can be generally categorized into two types, static and 
dynamic. Static load models use algebraic functions of the bus voltage, and 
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sometimes the frequency. Constant impedance, current, and power load models are 
examples of static models. Dynamic load models can incorporate motor dynamics, 
which are usually dependent on the states of the power system. More on load 
modeling can be found in [30], [31]. Both model types are studied in this chapter. 
The test case used for the studies in this chapter is derived from the 20 bus 
GIC benchmark test case from [32]. The test case consisted only of dc network 
information. Ac power flow data, as well as dynamic models and their parameters 
(see Appendix A) have been added in this chapter to this case to make it suitable 
for ac transient stability studies. The case features a 20 bus EHV network of 500 
kV and 345 kV voltages. The single line diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 10.  
 
Fig. 10. The 20 bus test case for the calculation of GIC [32] 
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There are a variety of transformers, including auto-transforms, generator 
step-up transformers, as well as two and three winding transformers. The 
transformers are configured in a number of ways depending on their windings. 
Delta wound transformers are modeled in the test case, even though they do not 
allow GIC to flow through them. It should be noted that there are two GIC blocking 
devices in this test case. One of the blocking devices is a capacitor placed in the 
neutral grounding connection of T1, located in substation 1. The second is a series 
capacitor placed between buses 5 and 11. Both these devices prevent GIC flow 
through their respective branches.  
  In order to make the case suitable for ac power flow and dynamic stability 
studies, typical 500 kV three conductor bundling and 345 kV two conductor 
bundling ac line parameters were added. 
The transient stability studies in this chapter use an integration time step of 
¼ cycle. The large disturbance being applied to the system is the increased reactive 
loading at transformer buses, arising from the GICs caused by the E3A electric 
field, approximately the first 60 seconds of the composite HEMP E3 wave from 
[5]. 
The initial power system operating point is kept constant for all the studies. 
In a real power system, transformers already operating near their maximum VA 
rating will enter saturation faster during an EMP than similar transformers that are 
not as heavily loaded, and hence would demand reactive power sooner. In this 
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dissertation, neither existing non-GIC loading nor proximity to saturation is 
considered in the calculation of QLoss. 
It is important to note that protection systems and models such as generator 
over-excitation limiters or under-voltage relays have not been modeled in the test 
system for simplicity, since the focus of the studies that follow is to provide 
example analyses of load models responding to an E3A disturbance. Basic 
protection system inclusion is considered later in the chapter. 
Static load models are commonly used in transient stability studies. Often, 
the frequency dependence of the load is neglected, resulting in the ZIP model. The 
ZIP model is implemented using (14). 
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  (14) 
PL and QL are the active and reactive components of the load. ?̅?  is a vector 
of the bus voltages. The model is composed of constant impedance (Z), constant 
current (I), and constant power (P) components. The coefficients p1 to p3 and q1 to 
q3 are the proportions of the load components, respectively. These parameters can 
be adjusted so that they accurately model the load, constrained such that the 
coefficients sum to one for each equation. 
The power system shown in Fig. 10 is subjected to the first 60 seconds of 
the HEMP induced electric field waveform of [5] for a static load model 
configuration. The load was modeled as 100% constant impedance. Four 
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simulations were run with this load configuration. Each simulation assumed peak 
geoelectric fields to be a fraction of the peak value in Fig. 9, namely 40%, 70%, 
and 100%, respectively. The fractions were chosen based on the spatial distribution 
of [10], assuming the system lies within a single region. A larger network could 
certainly span different peak value regions. For the 70% scenario, a series of steady-
state solutions was compared to the transient stability results. Series of steady-state 
solutions are often used to study voltage collapse in GMD analysis, wherein the 
electric field is increased in gradual steps of 0.5 or 1 V/km followed by calculating 
the GICs and losses. Here, the transient stability results and steady-state results do 
not match, as seen in Fig. 11, even with a step size as small as 0.01 V/km. The 
disturbance is changing at a rate that alters the dynamic response of the system, 
something that is not apparent in the steady-state solution.           
Shortly before the disturbance reaches its maximum, the steady-state 
solution experiences a blackout, misrepresenting the dynamic response of the 
system. The lowest bus voltage, bus 3, is shown over the length of the disturbance 
in Fig. 11. The shape of the E3 wave is also shown in Fig. 11 to show how the 
disturbance relates directly to the change in the voltages. For 40% scaling, the bus 
voltage dips just below 0.8 pu, for less than a second and below 0.9 pu for less than 
10 seconds. 
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Fig. 11. Bus 3 voltage for 100% constant Z load with HEMP E3 overlay 
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According to the proposed distribution of Fig. 7, most of the network would 
be in the 40% or less peak field regions. These initial studies are more valuable 
qualitatively than quantitatively. Understanding how existing load models respond 
to the simulated disturbance will provide insight to future HEMP E3 impact studies. 
As expected, the increased reactive power demand causes a rapid decline in 
the system bus voltages. It is important to note that the reactive power demand due 
to the disturbance, QLoss changes linearly with the terminal voltage of the 
transformer according to (6). The reactive power of the load, QL, is described by 
(14), with the constant Z load decreasing with the square of the bus voltage. 
Constant current and constant power load models will be more demanding than 
constant impedance load models under this E3 disturbance.  
The transient stability study shows that for this particular system, the buses 
that suffered the largest voltage drops were those furthest from the generation. The 
buses that are impacted the least are those closest to the generation. These two 
observations are not surprising. The buses further from the generation also have 
loads attached to them and are closer to the saturated high voltage transformers, 
thus intensifying their voltage drops.  
The transient stability analysis becomes more complicated when dynamic 
load models are considered. The models can include machine dynamics, often 
induction machines, to better characterize the load. Dynamic load models make 
such studies more realistic since a portion of the actual load is comprised of motors. 
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However, dynamic load model data is not always available, or known. It is often 
debated which models best represent the system response. There are several models 
to choose from when modeling a system’s load. This chapter uses the MOTORW 
load model [29], which is a commonly used three-phase induction motor model that 
represents aggregates of individual motors. The MOTORW model also includes a 
basic undervoltage relay which controls the state of the dynamic portion of the load. 
The MOTORW parameters used are shown in Appendix B. 
Another advantage of studying HEMP in transient stability is the ability to 
include the protection system. A general trend of transient stability studies is that 
they are increasingly including parts of the protection system. With proper 
protection systems in place, portions of the load would likely trip due to low 
voltage/damage. This leads to an important realization that protection systems 
could be configured in a way that could mitigate the effects of GIC. This key insight 
is recognized through studying the HEMP E3 problem in the transient stability 
domain, using dynamic models. This information is not apparent in steady-state 
simulations. Furthermore, less expensive mitigation strategies could be devised by 
configuring existing protection equipment accordingly. 
The following three studies investigate dynamic load model response with 
and without the consideration of basic power system protection. The load is 
comprised of dynamic and static models. The dynamic model used is the 
MOTORW model. The static model is comprised of 75% constant impedance, 25% 
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constant power; this ratio was chosen as an example. The E3A intensity chosen for 
this study is 70%. The lowest bus voltage, bus 3, is shown for each study in Fig. 
12. 
Without the protection system, the induction motors head toward stall and 
a delayed voltage recovery ensues, as seen in Fig. 12. The stalling of the induction 
machines results in a large reactive power demand on the system. There is not 
enough generation to satisfy the demand of the saturated transformers and the 
system load.  
Consider the same system and disturbance, but this time, basic undervoltage 
load relays are modeled into the induction motor portion of the load. If the relays 
are set to trip after being below 0.5 pu for 1 or more seconds, the systems voltage 
recovery is much quicker, as seen in Fig. 12. 
In the event of a HEMP, it is likely that portions of the load will be 
damaged/tripped due to the E1 and E2 waves [7]. This unwarranted load shedding 
could actually prove to be beneficial to system stability/recovery while the system 
is under the duress of the following E3 wave. The combination of the saturated 
transformers with the existing system load results in an overloaded system. 
Consider the previous case of 100% load, showing the delayed voltage recovery. If 
20% of the load is lost due to E1/E2 0.1 seconds before the E3 disturbance begins 
(1.1 seconds simulation time), the system experiences a much quicker voltage 
recovery, and suffers less of a penalty to the voltage magnitude, Fig. 12.  
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Fig. 12. Bus 3 voltage and frequency for dynamic load and mitigation scenarios 
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Suddenly losing large portions of the load can lead to frequency issues in 
the system. The frequency impacts are shown for each scenario in Fig. 12. 
Frequency constraints were not imposed during these simulations; however the 
frequency does not deviate more than 2.2% from the nominal value.  
These are a few of many possible scenarios that show how dynamic power 
system components could respond during a HEMP. Many existing dynamic models 
are capable of responding to the HEMP E3 effects shown in this dissertation and 
are readily available in transient stability packages. By no means are these studies 
conclusive. These studies shed light on the importance of transient stability analysis 
of power systems during HEMPs. 
This chapter has provided a methodology to model the impacts of HEMPs, 
specifically the E3A wave into power system transient stability simulations. It 
shows that the increased reactive power demand caused by the HEMP-induced 
GICs in transformers, in a time frame ranging in seconds, makes this a large-
disturbance, short-term voltage stability problem. Since load models play a key role 
in such type of voltage stability assessments, example studies with static and 
dynamic load models were presented to illustrate the possible impacts of an E3A 
wave on system voltages. A simple test system was provided to illustrate the 
methodology. Additionally, it was shown that the undesirable consequence of the 
E1/E2 waves tripping loads could potentially improve system stability, depending 
on the system characteristics, the amount of load shed, etc. Studying HEMP E3 in 
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transient stability enables the creation of more inexpensive mitigation strategies, 
such as configuring protection equipment for such a disturbance. It is clear that 
more detailed modeling is necessary, however the level of detail is to be 
determined. The case used in this chapter could certainly be more detailed, but it 
provides enough insight to suggest more detailed models for utilities studying this 
phenomenon is needed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HEMP E3 WAVEFORM SENSITIVITY 
The E3 field produced from a HEMP could be prone to slight variations due 
to various atmospheric conditions and weapon characteristics. As a result, studying 
the impacts of one specific field may be incomplete. In this chapter, slight variations 
to the IEC reference field are made in order to better understand the potential power 
system impacts and sensitivities to various geoelectric field characteristics.  The 
results show that the system’s response is the most sensitive to changes to the 
geoelectric field’s magnitude. 
The test case that will be subjected to the disturbances is an adaptation of 
the 20 bus GIC benchmark case found in [32]. The 20 bus case has been augmented 
to include dynamic models for the loads, generators, exciters, and governors. The 
case also has basic protection systems modeled in the form of over excitation 
limiters (OELs), load relays, generator relays, and line relays. The inclusion of the 
protection system in transient stability modeling for HEMP E3 analysis is vital to 
the dynamic response of the system. Frequency constraints on the system are 
imposed through the use of generator relays but are somewhat relaxed compared to 
typical frequency restrictions. The generator relays are configured to trip if the 
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frequency deviates beyond 3% for more than 5 seconds. Most of the load has been 
moved to a new 161 kV network, which has been added to the case. GIS 
information, as well as ac line parameter data has been added to the case in order 
to make it appropriate for GIC transient stability analysis [33]. A constant 
impedance load model is used for the entire load, throughout each simulation. 
Although it is not the focus of this chapter, it is possible that low-cost mitigation 
strategies could be developed by configuring protection systems appropriately for 
HEMP E3. A snapshot of the 42 bus system is shown in Fig. 13.  
 
Fig. 13. The 42 bus test case 
Four different potential HEMP E3 geoelectric fields were imposed on the 42 
bus system. These fields were developed arbitrarily by slightly perturbing the 
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reference IEC field. The fields are shown in Fig. 14, and all assume a uniform 
ground conductivity.  
1. IEC – reference HEMP E3 composite geoelectric field provided by the 
IEC 
2. Fast Rise – geoelectric field is identical to (1) except the field rises four 
times as fast 
3. Fast and High – geoelectric field rises and falls four times as fast and has 
an increased magnitude of 1.44 times  (1) 
4. Slow and Low – geoelectric field rises four times slower and reaches a 
peak magnitude of 0.625 times (1) 
The IEC does not provide spatial data for the geoelectric field. In order to 
simulate the effects of the weapon’s spatial distribution, each field was imposed on 
the system, scaled to 40%, 70%, and 100% of its peak field value. 
It is very possible that the power network may lie in a region that is not in 
the most intense area of the geoelectric field. Depending on the blast location and 
altitude, it is possible that most power networks could be in regions that experience 
significantly attenuated geoelectric fields. 
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Fig. 14. Geoelectric fields used for simulations, 100% scaling 
The area exposed to the 100% geoelectric field could be much less than the 
area exposed to less than 40% intensity [10]. It is also possible that large networks 
could span multiple areas of intensity. For this chapter, it is assumed the power 
network is small enough that it does not span multiple areas. In order to simulate 
the power network lying in entirely different geoelectric field intensity areas, the 
disturbances are scaled and separate simulations are run for each scaled 
disturbance. 
The first 60 seconds of the IEC reference geoelectric field was applied to 
the test case. After the first 60 seconds, the field has negligible magnitude and is 
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not changing fast enough to significantly impact the system dynamics, therefore it 
is not simulated. The lowest bus voltage of the system response is shown for each 
geoelectric field intensity in Fig. 15.  The system quickly collapses due to non-
convergence for the 100% and 70% cases. 
 
Fig. 15. System response to the IEC reference geoelectric field 
The reactive power demand is too significant for the system to recover. 
Without change to the temporal evolution of the field, it is not surprising that the 
higher intensity fields negatively impact the power system more than the 40% field. 
The system recovers from the 40% intensity field without loss of load. The system 
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experiences a voltage drop, dipping as low as 0.745 pu. Protection systems did not 
trigger since the states did not violate any of the protection system settings.  
A faster rising geoelectric field could pose as an increased threat to the 
short-term voltage stability of the power system. The fast rise field rises four times 
faster than the reference IEC field but decays at the same rate as the reference field. 
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 16. The faster rising field results in the 
system suffering a larger voltage drop at the most intense part of the disturbance, 
compared to that of the IEC reference scenario. The system fails in a similar fashion 
to that of the reference field for the 100% and 70% field intensity scenarios. 
 
Fig. 16. System response to the fast rising geoelectric field 
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However, the 40% field intensity scenario recovers without the loss of any 
load, despite the disturbance’s rise-time being four times that of the reference field. 
The fast and high geoelectric field rises and falls four times as fast as the 
reference field. It also is larger in magnitude by a factor of 1.44. The fast and high 
disturbance lasts about 160 seconds with non-negligible magnitude, therefore the 
entire disturbance is simulated. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 17. 
 
Fig. 17. System response to the fast and high rising geoelectric field 
The fast and high geoelectric field had the most impact to the power system, 
at all levels of intensity, when compared to the other IEC perturbed fields. The 
100% and 70% scenarios resulted in a non-convergence immediately as the 
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disturbance began. The system was able to maintain stability for the 40% scenario, 
however it did so by shedding load. The undervoltage load relays triggered on buses 
5, 27, and 33 according to their relay settings of being lower than 0.75 pu for more 
than 2 seconds. Between 3.1 seconds and 3.129 seconds, 1230 MVA was shed, or 
about ¼ of the system load. After the load was shed, and the disturbance began to 
decay, and the system settled into a new steady-state operating point with slightly 
higher bus voltages, since ¼ of the load remained offline. 
As expected, the slow and low geoelectric field had the least impact to the 
short-term voltage stability of the power system for all field intensity scenarios. The 
disturbance changes slowly enough that most of it is outside of the time response 
of the dynamics of the power system. However, the geoelectric field has a higher 
sustained geoelectric field than all of the others. The first 230 seconds of the 
geoelectric field was modeled into the simulations to catch any longer-term 
protection violations that would not have occurred for the other geoelectric fields. 
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 18. 
The first protections system action performed in the 100% field intensity 
scenario is the opening of generator 18 by an overexcitation relay at 13.65 seconds. 
A few seconds thereafter, a series of loads trips, followed by the remaining 
generators tripping at 144 seconds. The sustained geoelectric field proved to be too 
great for the system to maintain convergence. 
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Fig. 18. System response to the slow and low rising geoelectric field 
This is similar to how a system would fail due to a GMD, in the sense that 
the system cannot keep up with the additional load over time [28]. For the 70% 
intensity scenario, the lowest experienced voltage was 0.84 pu, no load was tripped, 
and the system returned to its original operating point. It should be noted that even 
though no load was shed, the system voltages were depressed longer than any of 
the other reference field perturbations. The system response to the 40% intensity 
scenario was very similar to that of the 70%. The 40% intensity scenario 
experienced a voltage as low as 0.92 pu. The slow and low field scenarios were the 
most forgiving to the system dynamics. Since the fields varied so slowly, the 
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dynamics of the system were able to keep up with the changes imposed by the 
disturbances. Also aiding in the robustness of the system response, compared to the 
other field perturbations, was the lower field magnitude.  
In order to directly compare the system responses to the various geoelectric 
fields more easily, the system responses to each 40% intensity field are shown 
together in Fig. 19. 
The system responses to the fast rise and IEC reference field are very 
similar. The most unique system responses are the responses to the slow and low 
geoelectric field and the fast and high geoelectric field, pointing toward the 
observation that a change in geoelectric field magnitude greatly impacts the system 
response. This is also observed by comparing the system responses to different field 
intensities of a specific geoelectric field. 
This chapter compared and studied the responses of a 42 bus power system 
subjected to potential HEMP E3 geoelectric fields. By applying perturbations to the 
IEC reference geoelectric field, sensitivities of certain field parameters were 
studied. It was shown that the system’s response was most sensitive to changes to 
the geoelectric field’s magnitude. Varying the rise and decay time of the field did 
impact the system response, but not to the extent that varying the magnitude did. 
How the system responds is very dependent on the dynamic models and protection 
system settings used in the power system model. 
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Fig. 19. Comparisons of the system response to 40% field intensities 
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The models and setting used in this chapter are popular choices in transient 
stability studies, with the exception of the relaxed frequency constraints. The 
impacts of E1 and E2 were not considered in this chapter. It is possible portions of 
the load would become damaged and drop before the E3 wave strikes, potentially 
impacting the dynamic response of the system.  
One extension of this research could be studying how neighboring power 
systems contribute to voltage stability during HEMP E3 disturbances. Neighboring 
power systems may be in higher or lower geoelectric field intensity areas, hence 
contributing or distributing the burden of reactive power loading to the network of 
interest. Similar research has been performed in the GMD domain, studying how 
sensitive GICs for individual transformers are to the assumed geoelectric field on 
the transmission lines [25]. These large system studies present research challenges, 
such as modeling the spatial distribution of the geoelectric fields as well as the 
incorporation of ground conductivity models. Delivering software that is capable 
of simulating the effects of HEMP E3 to power systems to the hands of power 
system operators and planners is a crucial step in the hopes of mitigating the threat. 
Planners and operators intimately know their systems and can better create 
mitigation strategies.  
HEMP E3 analysis belongs in the transient stability domain. Its faster rise-
times, on the order of seconds, separates it from steady-state GMD analysis. This 
chapter focused on the voltage response of the system. The frequency response of 
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the system is also of importance, but not the focus of this chapter. One of the many 
challenges of incorporating HEMP E3 into transient stability analysis is identifying 
the appropriate load models. This chapter assumes a constant impedance load 
model for the load. In reality, the load has dynamics associated with it as well, but 
can be very power system dependent. Power system operators and planners would 
be able to characterize their load more appropriately when performing studies such 
as these in an effort to mitigate the risks associated with HEMP E3. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ADVANCED GIC MODELING AND 
MITIGATION 
 
Few academics study the GIC modeling and simulation problem. As a 
result, the research output over the years has been somewhat sporadic. Recently, 
however, there has been a surge in research, thanks to various regulatory agency 
task forces and utilities.  As regulatory agencies begin to require certain levels of 
monitoring and protection against GIC, more advanced tools, data, and models are 
becoming available. This chapter focuses on the following three aspects of 
advanced GIC modeling: the time to saturation of transformers under dc current 
bias (GIC), impacts of transformer taping during HEMP E3, and non-uniform 
spatial distribution and ground conductivity models. The unique contributions of 
this chapter of the dissertation include taking existing advanced GIC models, 
improving/adapting the models for system studies, and performing/studying power 
system simulations with the improved, advanced models. 
The test case used for the simulations in this chapter is the 42 bus Illini 
GMD test case, which was used in Chapter 4. However, the case has been improved 
by adding more realistic load models, protection system settings, and advanced GIC 
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modeling capabilities. Information on the load models and protection system 
settings can be found in Appendix C. 
5.1 Time to Saturation of Transformers under DC Current Bias 
A current subject of research in the area of GIC transformer saturation is 
determining the time it takes a transformer to saturate due to GIC, if any. In steady-
state GMD analysis, this delay is of less importance since the analysis is performed 
in steady state, and thus the transformer is already saturated.  
Research points toward a delay on the order of a few seconds. A delay on 
the order of a few seconds could potentially impact HEMP E3 analysis, 
significantly, since the time scale of concern is already on the order of seconds to 
minutes. Ultimately, the delay in saturation translates into a delay, and possibly 
mitigation, of reactive power consumption.  
Assuming a delay does exist, the bigger question is how to model the delay. 
EMTP and finite element analysis were used in [24] to verify a delay model created 
for a specific transformer. The results indicate that the time to saturation is very 
dependent on the transformer’s configuration, winding resistances, GIC level, and 
most of all, the core’s magnetization characteristics. The magnetization curve was 
approximated to be piecewise linear. The time to saturation,  t s , was found to be 
  
 
2/3
1/2
0 0
0 0
21
2.23
2 31
sat pg
p N
f M LV V Vi I
t s
f K K R Ri I


      
      
        
. (15) 
53 
 
The following elements define (15): Rp is the total resistance in the primary 
circuit. RN is the grounding resistance. Lp is the inductance in the primary circuit. 
Msat is the magnetizing circuit’s inductance, while in saturation. Vg is the peak phase 
to ground voltage that is required so that the transformer operates at the knee of its 
magnetization curve. V0 is the peak phase to ground voltage. K0 is the applied dc 
potential. i  is the mean current that is reached while I is the final dc current. 
This analysis is suitable for single transformers, but is not appropriate for 
large power system analysis where there are thousands of transformers with 
unknown characteristics. A key observation from [24] is that the delay length is 
dependent on the amount of dc excitation the transformer is experiencing. For high 
amounts of dc current, the delay is small, on the order of a few seconds. For small 
amounts of dc current, in the case most geomagnetic disturbances, the delay can be 
minutes long. 
As a starting point, the delay can be simplified and generalized so that it can 
be applied to large-scale simulations. With the references indicating that the delay 
is on the order of seconds, a first-order lag delay was implemented in transient 
stability software. The delay is of the form  1 s T , where T is the user’s desired 
delay in seconds.  
To demonstrate this capability, a constant geoelectric field was applied to a 
power system with the time to saturation delay set to 1.0 seconds. A random 
transformer was observed during the simulation, the results are shown in Fig. 20. 
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Fig. 20. An example of a transformer saturation delay 
The delay takes the form of an exponential decay, e-Tt, in the time domain. This 
theory was applied to the 42 bus test case shown in Fig. 13. 
 The purpose of the following simulations is to determine generally how the 
time to saturation impacts the power system response. It is expected that the 
saturation delay will dampen the transient response of the system. Three scenarios 
were imposed on the system, (1) no saturation delay, (2) 2 second saturation delay, 
and (3) 10 second delay. The power system was exposed to the IEC HEMP E3 
waveform at 40% intensity. The system load was modeled as 20% MOTORW with 
the remaining 80% being split 75% constant impedance and 25% constant power. 
The voltage profile of the lowest bus voltage is shown for each scenario in Fig. 21. 
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Fig. 21. System responses to various saturation delays 
The 0 second delay scenario impacts the system the most drastically. The 
increased reactive power loading begins instantaneously as the disturbance evolves, 
yielding the worst-case scenario. All the load was shed followed by a complete 
system collapse. 
 For the 2 second delay scenario, the system is able to recover, but not 
without significant loss of load. The 2 second delay in saturation results in a delay 
in reactive power consumption during the initial rise of the HEMP E3 field. Buses 
23, 27, 32, 33, 35 and 41 shed their combined load of 1225 MW (675 Mvar).  
The system reaches its new operating point much slower as the delay is 
increased. The delay not only affects the transformer core’s time to saturation, but 
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also its time to desaturation. The disturbance has already been decreasing for five 
seconds before the reactive power consumption begins for the 10 second delay 
scenario. The entire rise and initial fall of the transient has been excluded from the 
reactive power consumption calculations. As a result, the scenario experiences the 
least loss of load, 300 MW (250 Mvar).    
Some of the system voltages reach a new steady-state operating point as 
high as 1.2 pu. This would obviously trigger overvoltage protection equipment. The 
takeaway, however, is that the saturation delay increases the system stability by 
mitigating the transient response induced by HEMP E3. System frequency is also 
of concern during these transients, but is not as significantly impacted by the 
saturation delay, due to the system inertia. The effects of the saturation delay are 
most easily observed through the system voltage response, hence it is shown here. 
Certainly, improvements can be made to the delay model suggested in this 
dissertation. This model serves as a starting point as more data and research is made 
available, regarding transformer GIC saturation. The first 10 seconds during HEMP 
E3 are the most violent, if that part of the transient can be reduced, a significantly 
healthier system response can be obtained. 
5.2 Impact of Transformer Tapping During HEMP E3 
Transformer tapping is another power system dynamic that occurs in the 
seconds to minute timeframe. It is not always included in transient stability 
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modeling, however, its temporal domain overlaps with HEMP E3 analysis. More 
on how tap changing affects voltage stability can be found in [34].  
A tapped transformer is a transformer that has the ability to regulate one side of 
the transformer’s voltage by adjusting the turns ratio slightly. The adjustment of 
the turns ratio is an automatic, mechanical process. To prevent excessive tapping, 
a tapping delay on the order of 30 seconds is usually embedded in the tapping 
process. The turns ratio is incrementally changed in discrete steps. Each step can 
take on the order of a few seconds to fully change. Taps were added to a number of 
transformers in the 42 bus test case, previously mentioned. The transformers are 
configured to begin tapping once the respective low side bus voltage increases 
above 1.08 pu or decreases below 0.96 pu. The taps have a maximum and minimum 
regulation potential of 1.1 pu and 0.9 pu, respectively.  
Two tapping scenarios were simulated and compared, slow tapping and fast 
tapping. The slow tapping scenario is configured so that there is a 30 second delay 
before the transformer begins to change its tap setting and when it first senses it 
should be changed. The tap is configured to step incrementally in 2 seconds. The 
fast tapping scenario has only a 2 second delay between sensing and changing the 
tap. It takes the tap 1 second to change one discrete step in the fast tapping scenario. 
The lowest bus voltage profile is shown for each scenario in Fig. 22. 
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Fig. 22. Transformer tapping voltage profiles 
Due to the delay on the two different tapping scenarios, the tapping does not 
significantly impact the fast dynamics during the initial rise of the disturbance. The 
tapping is most apparent as the system reaches its new steady-state operating point 
near the end of the simulations. The tap settings can be configured a number of 
ways, this is just a few examples of how changing the tapping delay affects the 
system response. The slow tapping scenario is not able to begin tapping until about 
the 90 second mark in the simulation since the voltage regulation bounds are not 
exceeded for a minimum of 30 seconds until then. The fast tapping was able to 
begin regulating the voltage much quicker since the minimum violation time to 
59 
 
begin tapping was much shorter. The tap changing of a transformer connecting 
buses 20 and 5 is shown in Fig. 23. 
 
Fig. 23. Transformer 20-5 tapping 
As expected, the tapping begins very quickly and is able to increase the bus 
voltages early on in the simulation. The transformer is set to its maximum tap 
setting for nearly 40 seconds before it begins to decrease as the disturbance 
decreases. The tap does not return to its original value. Since load was shed, the tap 
decreases in order to bring the system voltage back to a nominal level. Regulating 
the bus voltages is obviously desirable while attempting to maintain voltage 
stability. However, it may be also desirable to let the voltages fluctuate more than 
a normal tapping scheme would allow, in order to maintain frequency stability. For 
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example, if a large portion of the load is heavily voltage dependent, like a constant 
impedance load, and the system is at or near maximum loadability, maintaining the 
bus voltages and not letting them decrease to an “acceptable” level could result in 
load shedding, impacting the frequency stability of the system. If configured 
appropriately it is possible that transformer tapping can be used to mitigate 
disturbances like HEMP E3. 
5.3 Non-Uniform Spatial Distribution and Ground Conductivity Models 
Integrating HEMP E3 into steady-state power flow analysis begins by 
calculating the induced GIC. However, it is useful to have a basic understanding of 
the electric field that drives these GICs. Borrowing from GMD analysis, the electric 
field is induced from the earth’s perturbed magnetic field. Terrestrial-based 
magnetometers record the variations of the magnetic field, seen at the surface of 
the earth. The relationship between the electric field, E, and magnetic field, H, in 
the frequency domain, based on the plane wave method and layered earth 
assumption, is defined by the ground impedance function Z(ω) [35], [36].  
      E Z H    . (16) 
The ground impedance is heavily dependent on frequency. The earth behaves as a 
large conductor, and the electromagnetic waves will penetrate the earth to different 
depths, depending on the frequency. A basic view of the layered earth is shown in 
Fig. 24. 
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Fig. 24. Layered earth, from the USGS 
The United States is divided into regions, each with a unique ground impedance 
structure. The regions, Fig. 25, are laterally uniform within the region. In other 
 
Fig. 25. Ground impedance regions for the United States, provided by the USGS 
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words, the impedance varies only with depth, in each region. The regions are 
modeled in piece-wise linear fashion, Fig. 26. A ground impedance model for the 
 
Fig. 26. Ground impedance structure of New England (Model NE-1), provided by 
the USGS 
 
New England province is shown in Fig. 26. The general trend across the ground 
impedance regions is that the conductivity increases with depth. The ground 
impedance structure provides the data needed to calculate the ground impedance 
function Z(ω). The algorithm used for calculating Z(ω) is based off of [36], [37]. 
This method is verified by using magnetometer data taken during geomagnetic 
storms and comparing the calculated GICs from the magnetic fields. 
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The iterative procedure begins by first calculating the intrinsic impedance 
of the bottom-most layer, layer n. 
   nn n
n
E
Z j
H
    , (17) 
where En and Hn are the electric and magnetic field intensity, respectively, at layer 
n, j is the imaginary number, ω is the angular frequency, μ is the permeability, 
approximated as μ0, and ρn is the resistivity of the nth layer. The layers above the 
bottom layer need to account for each layer below itself by including the effects of 
the abrupt impedance changes at the boundaries between the each layer, as well as 
the layer depths. In general, the impedance at the ith layer, except the bottom layer, 
is calculated as, 
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where ∆hi is the ith layer thickness, γi is the ith layer propagation constant, and ηi is 
the intrinsic impedance of layer i. For an n layer earth model, (17) will be calculated 
first, and only once. Next, (18) is calculated a total of n-1 times, starting from the 
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lowest uncalculated layer, moving toward the surface. The final result is a function 
Z(ω), the total impedance seen at the surface for a given frequency, ω. 
Next, the provided magnetometer data, B(t), is transformed into the 
frequency domain using a fast Fourier transform (FFT), yielding B(ω). The 
magnetic flux density is then converted into magnetic field intensity, H(ω) and 
multiplied in the frequency domain with the impedance function to obtain the 
geoelectric field at the surface of the earth in the frequency domain, (16). Lastly, 
the inverse FFT is taken to obtain the geoelectric field seen at the surface of the 
earth in the time domain. This geoelectric field serves as input data for the 
calculation of GIC. Through this research, a tool was created in MATLAB which 
scrapes data in real time from the online magnetometers and calculates the induced 
geoelectric field at the desired location for GMDs. It is possible that this tool could 
be expanded to handle higher frequency disturbances that interact with the ground, 
such as HEMP E3. 
Up to this point, the simulations used in this dissertation have assumed a 
uniform ground conductivity of 10-4 S/m and, unless otherwise noted, a spatial 
distribution factor of 40% intensity. This conductivity is suggested by the IEC and 
claims that the IEC HEMP E3 electric field scales as 1  . It should be noted that 
the frequency of which the IEC waveform is based on remains classified. The 
following simulation has non-uniform spatial distribution, as well as non-uniform 
65 
 
ground conductivity. The spatial and ground conductivity distributions are divided 
as shown in Fig. 27. 
 
Fig. 27. Ground conductivity and spatial distribution mappings 
The purple region in Fig. 27 exhibits a spatial distribution of 40% peak E3 
intensity and a ground conductivity of 2x10-4 S/m, twice that of the IEC HEMP E3 
field. The green region is characterized by a spatial distribution of 25% peak E3 
intensity and a ground conductivity of 10-4 S/m. The two regions were chosen 
arbitrarily.  
Doubling the conductivity effectively reduced the field intensity by a factor 
of 0.707 for the purple region. The combined intensity of each region can be seen 
by multiplying the spatial distribution factor times the ground conductivity factor, 
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resulting in a percentage of the IEC HEMP E3 field intensity. The purple region 
has an overall intensity of approximately 0.283 times the IEC HEMP E3 field and 
the green region has an intensity of 0.25 times the IEC HEMP E3 field. The 
simulation results, in the form of the lowest bus voltage profile, are shown in Fig. 
28. The simulation uses a transformer saturation delay of 5 seconds. The 
transformer taps are set on a 15 second delay with 2 second tap change timing. In 
some sense, this simulation combines all of the modeling techniques developed thus 
far.  
 
Fig. 28. Bus voltage for non-uniform ground conductivity and spatial distribution 
case 
 
In this case, the chosen ground conductivities and spatial distributions 
lessened the severity of the disturbance to a level in which the system was able to 
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recover without the loss of load. If the ground conductivity is halved, instead of 
doubled in one region, the intensity factor increases by a factor of 2  and the 
system quickly collapses. The system responses can be highly dependent on the 
spatial and ground conductivity distributions. How the peak IEC HEMP E3 
geoelectric field varies as a function of uniform ground conductivity is shown in 
Fig. 29. 
 
Fig. 29. Peak geoelectric field variation as a function of uniform ground 
conductivity 
 
The overall geoelectric field intensity could take on an infinite value of 
intensities since the field is highly dependent on so many things. The scenario 
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shown in Fig. 27 is just one example. It should be noted that the frequency 
dependence of the ground conductivity has been ignored in this simulation.   
In order to calculate the frequency-dependent non-uniform ground 
conductivities, magnetic field information regarding the disturbance must be 
obtained. Since the IEC does not disclose the magnetic field perturbations 
associated with the nuclear blast, it must be calculated from the provided 
geoelectric field and ground conductivity. A purely horizontal magnetic field is 
calculated according to  
    0
0
t d
B t E
t
  

 


 .   (19) 
E(t) is the electric field given by the IEC. The resulting magnetic field, B(t), is 
shown in Fig. 30. 
 
Fig. 30. The B3(t) reconstructed from E3(t) 
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With the calculated magnetic field, new ground conductivity models can be 
applied and the induced geoelectric field can then be calculated as, 
  
 
0
0
1 t dB tdt
E t
dtt t 



  . (20) 
 Detailed assumptions and conditions for this procedure can be found in 
[10]. This method allows for frequency-dependent non-uniform ground 
conductivity models to be included into HEMP E3 analysis and has been verified 
for GMD analysis in [37] with GIC GMD data. 
5.4 GIC Mitigation 
Currently, mitigation techniques for GIC are focused on the strategic 
placement of GIC blocking devices [2], such as [38] by EMPrimus. In a simplistic 
view, these devices are effectively capacitors, installed in the neutral connection of 
wye-grounded transformers. The capacitors prevent dc current flow, while allowing 
ac current flow. This ensures a solid ground connection during fault conditions, 
while blocking GIC.  
Adjusting the topology of the network is another form of mitigation. 
Topology control has been overlooked in the area of GIC mitigation. An example 
of topology control in the presence of E3 is presented here, on the 42 bus test case, 
using an interactive simulator.  
Consider the 42 bus case used in Chapter 4, with the IEC HEMP E3 
disturbance scaled to 40% of its original strength. The peak geoelectric field for 
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this disturbance is 15.5 V/km. The loads are modeled by 100% constant impedance. 
Without mitigation, the system experiences a frequency collapse around the 60 
second mark, as seen in Fig. 31 and Fig. 32. 
At 12.8 seconds, load 27 is tripped due to low voltage. At 21.4 seconds, the 
over-excitation limiter opens the relay to generator 8. At 60 seconds, the rest of the 
generators trip due to under frequency. 
 
Fig. 31. Bus voltages in per unit for 42 bus case with no mitigation 
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Fig. 32. Generator frequencies for 42 bus case with no mitigation 
The following mitigation strategy is proposed to bring awareness to the 
mitigation issue. It is by no means optimized. The control actions taken, must be 
taken very quickly, perhaps much faster than an operator would be able to respond 
to the disturbance. However, as grid automation increases, a disturbance like this 
could be mitigated by automatic grid action.  
Topology load control algorithms is a mitigation strategy which focuses on 
intelligent load switching. The decision to take mitigation action is based on the 
rate of change of voltage and frequency, as well as absolute voltage and frequency. 
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By controlling the load status, the dispatched power can attend to the saturated 
transformers, while the load is temporarily not serviced.  
Intentional line outaging is also a viable option. Line outaging mitigates the 
effects of GIC by redirecting the flow of GIC. Also, outaging a line results in a 
reduction of GIC, since there will be no induced voltage on that line. One could 
imagine redirecting the flow of GIC toward areas of the system that have more 
available generation, or to more secure paths out of the system. When considering 
intentional outaging of a line, line length, GIC path, and local generation are key 
factors in the decision-making process.  
The resulting voltage and frequency plots show the system fully recovering 
from the disturbance using load switching techniques, Fig. 33 and Fig. 34.  
Load 6 is switched out at 12 seconds in an effort to keep the system 
frequency within tolerance. As the reactive power demand on the system decreases 
with E3, the load is switched back in at 50 seconds. The system resumes its original 
operation at nominal voltage and frequency. 
 
73 
 
 
Fig. 33. Bus voltages for 42 bus case with load control mitigation 
 
Fig. 34. Generator frequencies for 42 bus case with load control mitigation 
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Of all the available options for GIC mitigation, we believe topology control 
is the most promising. Of course, placing blocking devices on every GIC entry point 
could eliminate the GIC problem, it is not realistic for obvious reasons. Leveraging 
the existing infrastructure, like the protection system, to aid in topology control 
could significantly reduce the threat of GIC to a manageable level. Ultimately each 
power system is unique and behaves differently. That is why we recommended that 
power system operators and planners be at the forefront of creating mitigation 
strategies for their respective systems.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has developed models and tools in order to help 
characterize HEMP E3 impacts to power systems. Traditionally, many dynamics 
are not included in transient stability runs that are crucial in HEMP E3 analysis. 
Dynamics on the order of seconds to minutes are of prime influence. Power system 
responses can be very specific. Hence, the results can be very system dependent. 
That is why the intention of this research is to inform and equip power system 
operators and planners with models and tools encompassing the specific level of 
detail needed for HEMP E3 analysis.  
A natural extension of this research is to increase the detail of the dynamic 
models used in the simulations. Load modeling, transformer saturation modeling, 
and protection system modeling, in many ways, are new to transient stability 
analysis. In particular, how to characterize a power systems load is an ongoing 
research topic that has major influence on transient stability results [29], [30], [31]. 
Including the protection system in transient stability analysis is becoming more 
popular. However, major questions remain about how the protection system should 
be configured in the simulations.  
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The modeling of a single transformer can be very unique. Slight differences 
in the core materials, windings, etc. can affect how transformers respond. There is 
significant room for improvement on understanding how high voltage transformers 
respond to dc current. Research topics such as transformer half-cycle saturation, 
even and odd harmonic generation, and reactive power consumption could play a 
major role in this research [18].  
The studies performed in this dissertation involved relatively small systems, 
less than 42 buses. Since the HEMP E3 disturbance can be continental at scale, 
large system studies are encouraged, but will be met with their own challenges. 
This research primarily observed the voltage response of the simulated systems. 
The frequency response of the system is important and is certainly impacted by 
HEMP E3. Expanding the dynamic models beyond uniform frequency models 
could provide further insight into HEMP E3 analysis.  
Ultimately, finding ways to mitigate the HEMP E3 threat is paramount. 
Mitigation strategies can lead to reactionary plans, like those for space weather 
events, which will aid the grid in its resiliency to such a threat [39]. Existing 
mitigation strategies for GMD induced GIC, such as GIC blocking devices, could 
play a role in HEMP E3 mitigation. Other techniques, such as topology control 
algorithms, [40], and protection system configurations have yet to be explored in 
depth for this application, but could yield promising results.   
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Modeling and simulation is a balance of detail and computation time. The 
codes written for this research were all run on an ordinary personal computer. As 
more data surrounding GIC becomes available, and the level of dynamic power 
system modeling increases, more meaningful results could be extracted from 
research in this field. 
High impact, low frequency events pose a severe threat to the electric grid. 
While it may be unreasonable, or even impossible, to eliminate these threats 
entirely, it may be possible to mitigate them to a manageable risk. The ever 
increasing complexity of the grid leads to a less secure, more vulnerable, system. 
As the grid continues to grow, cyber and physical security should be of upmost 
importance to power system engineers. 
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APPENDIX A 
PARAMETERS ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE 20 BUS GIC BENCHMARK CASE 
USED IN CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 This appendix lists the dynamic parameters used for the dynamic models 
associated with the 20 bus GIC benchmark case used in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. PowerWorld Simulator was used for the simulations. 
TABLE A.1: MOTORW Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
Pul 0-.3 TV 30.0 
Ls 3.6 Tbkr 0.0333 
Lp 0.17 Acc 0.6 
Ra 0.0068 Lpp 0.17 
Tpo 0.53 Tppo 0 
H 0.5 ndelt 10.0 
D 2.0 wdelt 0.8 
VT 0.6 Mbase 0.0 
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TABLE A.2: Transformer Series Reactance and Reactive Power Model (K Value) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transformer Series 
Reactance 
(pu) 
K Value 
T1 0.014 1.183 
T2 0.025 1.163 
T3 0.012 1.183 
T4 0.012 1.183 
T5 0.025 1.143 
T6 0.011 0.816 
T7 0.011 0.816 
T8 0.025 1.163 
T9 0.025 1.163 
T10 0.015 0.816 
T11 0.015 0.816 
T12 0.025 1.163 
T13 0.025 1.163 
T14 0.025 1.163 
T15 0.025 1.143 
 
80 
 
 
TABLE A.3: GENROU Parameters 
 
TABLE A.4: IEEET1 Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H 3.0 Tdop 7.0 
D 0.0 Tqop 0.75 
Ra 0.0 Tdopp 0.035 
Xd 2.1 Tqopp 0.05 
Xq 0.5 S(1.0) 0.0 
Xdp 0.2 S(1.2) 0.0 
Xqp 0.5 Rcomp 0.0 
Xdpp 0.18 Xcomp 0.0 
Xl 0.15   
 
Tr 0.0 Tf 1.46 
Ka 50.0 Switch 0.0 
Ta 0.04 E1 2.8 
Vrmax 6.0 SE(E1) 0.04 
Vrmin -6.0 E2 3.73 
Ke -0.06 SE(E2) 0.33 
Te 0.60 Spdmlt 0.0 
Kf 0.09   
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TABLE A.5: Transmission Line AC Parameters 
 
TABLE A.6: IEEEG1 Parameters
  
From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
Resistance 
(Ohm/m) 
Reactance 
(Ohm/m) 
Susceptance 
(Siemens/m) 
2 3 3.511238 37.49288 641.5448 
17 2 3.52314 36.89775 642.735 
4 5 2.35 38.625 4125 
4 5 2.35 38.625 0 
4 6 4.675 76.875 8200 
15 4 1.975 34.5 3500 
5 6 2.975 44.5 6160 
6 11 1.45 24.025 2542.5 
15 6 2.925 48 5125 
15 6 2.925 48 5125 
11 12 2.325 40.75 4075 
21 11 3.5 58.125 6180 
16 17 4.66578 45.46755 849.8385 
16 20 4.04685 41.4207 741.5258 
17 20 6.939158 64.51155 1266.426 
 
K 25.0 Uc -10.0 T3 0.1 K1 1.0 
T1 0.0 Pmax 1.0 Uo 1.0 
All 
others 
0.0 
T2 0.0 Pmin 0.0 T4 0.1   
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APPENDIX B 
PARAMETERS ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE 42 BUS TEST CASE USED IN 
CHAPTER 4 
 
This appendix lists the dynamic parameters used for the dynamic models 
associated with the 42 bus test case used in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
PowerWorld Simulator was used for the simulations. The case is available online 
[33]. The online version of the case, used in Chapter 4, contains the following 
parameters: AC lines, governors, generators, exciters, over-excitation limiters, 
transformers, governor relays, line relays, load relays, and component limits. The 
load in Chapter 4 was purely constant impedance.  
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APPENDIX C 
PARAMETERS ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE 42 BUS TEST CASE USED IN 
CHAPTER 5 
 
This appendix lists the dynamic parameters used for the dynamic models 
associated with the 42 bus test case used in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
PowerWorld Simulator was used for the simulations. This test case is extremely 
similar to the test case used in Chapter 4, with the following modifications: The 
load was 20% MOTORW with the remaining load split 75% constant impedance 
and 25% constant power. The load relays were adjusted to trip if the bus voltage 
dipped below 0.9 pu for more than one second. Shunt relays were added to the 
system, as well as LTCs with a step size of .00625. 
TABLE C.1: MOTORW Parameters 
 
Pul 0.2 TV 30.0 
Ls 3.6 Tbkr 0.0333 
Lp 0.17 Acc 0.6 
Ra 0.0068 Lpp 0.17 
Tpo 0.53 Tppo 0 
H 0.5 ndelt 10.0 
D 2.0 wdelt 0.8 
VT 0.6 Mbase 0.0 
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TABLE C.2: LTC Transformers 
From Number To Number Circuit 
33 16 2 
27 3 1 
6 36 1 
23 2 2 
20 5 1 
23 2 1 
6 36 2 
3 27 2 
17 22 1 
20 5 2 
16 33 1 
22 17 2 
12 37 2 
12 37 1 
 
TABLE C.3: LTC Model (LTC1) 
Tdelay Tmotion 
15 2 
 
TABLE C.4: Shunt Relay (CAPRELAY) 
Tfilter 0 t2On 0.5 
tbClose 0.05 V1Off 1.2 
tbOpen 0.05 t1Off 1 
V1On 0.9 V2Off 1.15 
t1On 1 t2Off 0.5 
V2On 0.85   
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